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Abstract 
We present a class of hardware-based cryptographic one-way functions that, in 
practice, would be hard to invert even if P=NP and linear-time satisfiability 
algorithms exist. Such functions use a hardware-based component with Ω(n2) size 
circuits, and Ω(n2) run time. 
1. Introduction 
Suppose someone has just proved that P=NP. A press conference is presented … 
the news travel at light speed through the world. Many emergency meetings are held 
at the major cryptographic security companies and government agencies. Malicious 
hackers start distributing linear-time decryption programs in the dark web. The end of 
the world is near! Well … not that fast. 
In this paper, we prove that there is a class of cryptographic one-way functions 
that are, for all practical purposes, hard to invert even by the world’s fastest 
computers, and even if P=NP: hardware-based Ω(n2) cryptographic one-way 
functions. 
The idea of hardware-based cryptography is not new. Plenty of research on the 
subject has been made during the past three decades. A good survey may be found in 
[G09]. 
Despite the intense research on hardware-based cryptography, such efforts have 
been concentrated in mainly two areas: (i) increase of performance by exploiting 
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hardware capabilities; and (ii) tamper-proof  trapdoors, where the hardware provides 
tamper-proof methods for storing information essential for cryptographic functions 
that cannot be shared. Since the idea of using “slower” cryptographic functions seems 
counter-intuitive, we have not found any research effort that has been done in this 
aspect. This is the main contribution of our work. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present an 
overview of hardware-based Ω(n2) cryptographic one-way functions. In Section 3, a 
typical application scheme is presented.  The computational cost of using a linear-
time SAT algorithm for finding the inverse of this class of functions is presented  in 
Section 4. Finally, our conclusions are presented in Section 5. 
2. Hardware-Based Ω(n2) Cryptographic One-Way 
Functions 
A hardware-based Ω(n2) cryptographic one-way function (HCOWF2, for short) is 
a cryptographic one-way function that satisfies the following conditions: 
1. It performs Ω(n2) unique hardware-based computations; and 
2. Each hardware-based computation is performed in O(1) time by a Ω(n2)-
size circuit. 
The parameter n is typically called the “security parameter”, or the “number 
of bits” of the function. A hardware-based computation is unique if the value of its 
inputs is not repeated in any subsequent computation, and the value of its outputs at 
each computation has c/2n probability of being repeated by any subsequent 
computation; where c ≥ 1. 
It is easy to implement a practical HCOWF2 using current hardware and 
software technology. For example, a 2048-bit function may take roughly 109 
instructions (assuming 100 instructions per computation) , which would take 1 
millisecond to compute with an Intel Celeron processor. In terms of hardware, such a 
function would roughly take 4 million gates, which can easily be implemented with 
any SRAM-based FPGA, and  configured in less than a millisecond. 
Contrary to what common sense may tell (e.g., look for linear lower bounds), 
we want an HCOWF2 to have a quadratic lower bound in both its hardware and 
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software components. The motivation behind this is to make an HCOWF2 
practically-hard to invert by current technology, even if P=NP. At the same time, we 
should be able to upgrade the security parameter as technology advances. It should be 
noted that this upgrade approach is not new, and is currently used in RSA encryption, 
where the security parameter is doubled in size every few years. 
A quadratic lower bound in computational complexity can be achieved by 
making sure that a Ω(n) algorithm is executed n times, one for each of the n-bits 
specified by the security parameter. An example of this approach are Tau one-way 
functions [A16], which do n traversals through a bit matrix for every bit of its n-bit 
output. 
A quadratic lower bound in the circuit complexity of the O(1) hardware-based 
computation can be achieved by constructing a characteristic random function H, 
whose logic circuit size is Ω(n2) gates, specific to the HCOWF2. Typically, H returns 
an n-bit integer, and is invoked as H(p,q) where p is the input to the HCOWF2 (which 
could be a public key or a message digest), and q is a parameter from a set Q of 
random n-bit values, where |Q| = n2.  
The function H describes the Ω(n2)  hardware component. It is defined as H: 
{0,1}n x {0,1}n → {0,1}n. The circuit for H can be generated by creating, for each 
output bit of H, a random 2n-variable Boolean formula from n irreducible k-CNF 
clauses, where k>2. Half of the 2n variables correspond to the “p” parameter, and the 
other half corresponds to “q”. Let C be the set of all clauses that describe H, then each 
clause c in C is irreducible if there does not exist another clause c’ in C with a set of 
variables common with c, that differ by only one literal. The total number of clauses 
is Ω(n2), with a total number of gates in the circuit bounded by Ω(n2). 
3. Application Scheme 
In a typical application scheme, both the sender and the receiver have a 
configurable, hardware-based H(p,q) component, as shown in Figure 1. While the 
sender stores its function description in a data store, the receiver maintains a cache of 
function descriptions; this avoids that senders be required to send their function 
description if it hasn’t changed. Each function description includes the specification 
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of the characteristic random function (H), as well the unique parameters to be passed 
to the function in each hardware-based computation. The description may also 
include other function-specific parameters as well.  
On the sender’s side, there is a one-time hardware configuration process, as 
shown for steps 1 and 2. The sender loads its function description from the data store, 
and configures the hardware component appropriately. 
When sending a message, the sender runs its HCOWF2 by doing Ω(n2) 
computations on the hardware component to build the message hash. Before sending 
the message, the sender sends a function-description signature to the receiver (step 4), 
which is used by the receiver to lookup the function description in its cache (step 5). 
In the case of a cache-miss, the receiver replies with a request for the sender to send 
its function description (step 6), to which the sender replies accordingly (step 7). In 
the case of a successful cache lookup in the receiver, steps 6 and 7 are not needed. 
The receiver then configures its hardware component using the function description. 
Upon receiving a message and its authentication code (MAC) (step 9), the 
receiver verifies the MAC by doing Ω(n2) computations on the hardware component, 
following the parameters of the function description. 
Figure 1. A typical application scheme 
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4. Computational Cost of Inversion with SAT if P=NP 
Assuming P=NP, there exists a polynomial-time algorithm that solves the 
Boolean satisfiability (SAT) problem. It has been shown in [V04] that there is an 
almost-linear lower bound for a SAT algorithm, if P=NP. Thus, in order to invert a 
HCOWF2, it would be a matter of creating a Boolean circuit that represents the 
output, generate a k-CNF formula for the circuit, and run a linear-time SAT algorithm 
to determine the inputs to the formula. In this section, we will show that, even if this 
is the case, the computational cost of inverting HCOWF2 is high. 
Given an n-bit output of a HCOWF2, a unique logic circuit represents each 
hardware-based computation (since each hardware-based computation is guaranteed 
to be unique). The number of gates of the circuit is bounded by Ω(n2). Since there are 
Ω(n2) unique hardware-based computations, a circuit that represents a HCOWF2 has 
a circuit whose total number of gates is bounded by Ω(n4).  
A Tseytin transformation [T70] provides the most compact 3-CNF representation 
of a logic circuit, with the drawback that there can be 3m total number of clauses, and 
3m total number of extra variables, where m is the circuit size. Thus, there will be a 
total of  Ω(3n4+n) variables, and Ω(3n4) clauses. Each literal will take 
Ω(log(3n4+n)+1) bits to be represented in each clause (the extra bit to indicate 
negation); and Ω(3log(3n4+n)+3) total bits per clause, as there are exactly three 
literals per clause. Therefore, the total number of bits needed to represent the Boolean 
formula for a HCOWF2 is bounded by Ω(3n4 (3log(3n4+n)+3)).  
Let’s do some math  for our 2048-bit example. The size of a 3-CNF Boolean 
formula for a 2048-bit HCOWF2 will not be less than 3(2048)4(3log(3(2048)4)+3) ≈ 
7.3 x 1015 bits ≈ 9 x 1014 bytes ≈ 828 TB. That would be the total amount of memory 
needed to contain the Boolean formula for a single inversion. No single computing 
node has 828 TB of memory, thus a massively-parallel computer with thousands of 
nodes would be needed, where the formula is partitioned among the nodes to be able 
to fit the node’s memory. Even for the case of P=NP, it has a great impact on the 
computational cost. 
Since a massively-parallel computer is needed to solve SAT for the given 
formula, two approaches may be considered: formula partitioning and search-space 
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partitioning. In the first case, the formula is partitioned optimally among the 
processing nodes, such that each node decides satisfiability on all the partitions; if all 
partitions are satisfiable, then the formula is satisfiable. In the case of search 
partitioning, each node evaluates the whole formula but in different search spaces, 
each one given by a subset of all possible variable assignments. 
For the case of formula partitioning, if P=NP, a linear-time algorithm may exist to 
obtain an optimal partitioning. But such an algorithm must run a single node; 
otherwise, we will need to solve an optimal-partitioning-partitioning problem, to 
partition the partitioning problem into the computing nodes, and so forth. Thus a 
formula of size 3(2048)4(3log(3(2048)4)+3) bits would need to be scanned at least 
once.  
For our 2048-bit example, a minimum of  approximately 9 x 1014 bytes would 
need to be scanned in a single node. At current clock speeds of 4GHz, a minimum of 
2.2 x 105 seconds  ≈ 63 hours would be needed. 
For the case of search-space partitioning, the situation is not any better. In this 
approach, each processing node evaluates the formula against a subset of the variable 
assignments; then the formula is satisfiable if one node finds a satisfiable assignment 
within its search space.  Since the whole formula needs to be scanned in each node, 
the minimum processing time is similar to formula partitioning. 
For our 2048-bit example, the 63-hour minimum time is just for finding the 
satisfiability for a single-variable assignment. However, there are Ω(3n4) variables in 
our formula, thus Ω(3n4) executions of SAT decisions will be needed with self-
reduction. Therefore,  the minimum time required to find a satisfiable assignment is 
64 x 3(2048)4 = 3.4 x 1015 hours = 3.8 x 1011 years! And that’s even for the case of 
P=NP and the assumption of the existence of linear-time algorithms for SAT and 
partitioning. 
5. Conclusion 
We have presented a class of hardware-based cryptographic one-way functions 
that are resilient to inversion by SAT algorithms, even if P=NP and such algorithms 
run in linear time in the world’s fastest massively-parallel computers. The idea of 
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such functions is to perform computations in a time bounded by Ω(n2), and circuits 
bounded by Ω(n2) in size. As a result, even with the application of compact 
transformations to Boolean formulas, such as Tseytin’s, the resulting size of the 
formula makes it impractical to find the inverse of the function by any linear-time 
SAT algorithm.  
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